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Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, as a result of democratic 
processes and the inclination towards the West as prevailing in the emerging 
Russian Federation, the State authorities made a decision on Russia’s accession 
to the Council of Europe (CE). The accession procedure commenced on 7 May 
1992, with Russia’s submitting a formal request to the CE. In response, the CE 
sent its representatives to the Russian Federation to investigate the actual status of 
the complying with human rights in that country. They found that the protection 
granted to human rights under Russian legislation, and Russia’s “entering the 
democracy path”, were both more theoretical than practical.1 The first visit by 
CE representatives was soon followed by others, all of which led to similar 
conclusions.
The first problem with Russia’s accession to the Council of Europe appeared 
in 1995 in connection with the First Chechen War, and on 2 February 1995 the 
accession procedure was suspended. It was soon recommenced under Resolution 
1065 of 27 September 1995, based on Moscow’s undertaking, to search for the 
politically viable ways of solving the Chechen conflict. Russia was eventually 
1  B. Bouring, Вступление России в Совет Европы и Защита Прав Человека: Всерьез Ли 
Выполняются Обязательства?, http://www.hrights.ru/text/b10/Chapter5.htm, publication date 
missing, [access: 23.05.2017].
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admitted to the Council of Europe on 28 February 1996, officially becoming 
the 39th CE Member. On 25 January 1996, 164 deputies of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe voted for Russian accession to the CE, with 
35 votes against and 15 abstentions. The opponents justified their decision by 
referring to the limited observance of human rights in the Russian Federation, 
and to the continuation of imperial Soviet policies, reflected in acts of aggression 
towards Chechnya.2
When joining the Council of Europe, Russia undertook to abide by the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ratified by 
Russia in 1998, hereinafter “the Convention”) and recognised the jurisdiction of 
the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. Many experts stressed that the 
Russian Federation was receiving a credit of trust on its accession, having failed 
to satisfy some of the CE standards. For instance, the following observations were 
made during the UN inspection of Russian penal institutions and detention wards, 
The Special Envoy would need Dante’s poetic talent and Bosch's artistic skills to accurately 
depict the infernal conditions he encountered in these cells. Intensified feelings of smell, touch, taste 
and vision. The conditions are cruel, inhumane and degrading; they are themselves torture. Since 
the suspects are being held there to speed up investigations by breaking their will, in order to obtain 
confessions and information, they might as well be considered they are being tortured.3 
Despite such observations, it was commonly believed that Moscow would 
take measures to fully implement the CE values through appropriate amendments 
to its national laws. Unfortunately, the sceptical voices soon proved to be right, 
with Moscow ‒ which only a couple of years later entered an authoritarian path 
‒ being less willing to comply with its obligations. Coupled with the aggressive 
Russian foreign policy, this led to increasingly strong conflicts between the 
Russian Federation and the Council of Europe, on the one hand, and between the 
Russian Federation and the ECHR, on the other. These conflicts soon reached the 
point at which the enforcement of ECHR decisions was viewed by the Kremlin 
as directly impinging on its political and economic interests. This forced the 
State authorities to establish an effective political and legal tool which would 
not only enable but also justify Russia's failure to comply with ECHR rulings. 
This function was eventually entrusted to the Constitutional Court (CC) of the 
Russian Federation.
On 18 November 2010, during the International Forum on Constitutional 
Justice in St Petersburg, Valery Zorkin, Chairman of the Russian CC, objected 
to the “politicisation” of some of the ECHR rulings, threatening that the Russian 
Federation would withdraw from the Convention. This statement had probably 
2  Ibidem.
3  Ibidem.
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been discussed in detail with the Russian authorities, and its objective was, 
firstly, to put the ECHR under pressure before the expected verdict in the case 
of shareholders in Yukos ‒ a crude oil giant, accusing Russia of the unlawful 
acquisition of the company. Secondly, it was meant to pave the ideological and 
normative way for the subsequent failure to comply with the ECHR decision 
on this matter (with the verdict’s being rightly assumed to disfavour Moscow). 
Strictly speaking, the Chairman of the Russian CC advocated that Russia did 
not have to treat the ECHR verdicts related to sovereignty as binding.4 Through 
Zorkin’s speech, Russia clearly expressed its dissatisfaction with the ECHR's 
accepting the complaint filed by the Russian opposition against the course of the 
2003 Parliamentary elections, and the Court’s judgement in the case of a Russian 
soldier requesting that the same single-parent rights be granted to men as to 
women (i.e. the right to a three-year child care leave).
This clearly marked the beginning of the process of creating specific tools 
to enable the Russian Federation not to enforce some of the ECHR rulings, 
which eventually led to amending the Act on the Constitutional Court of the 
Russian Federation dated 14 December 2015. This process was accompanied 
by a fierce media campaign conducted by Zorkin, who zealously justified the 
increasing conflict between Russia and the ECHR in his several articles. Zorkin 
unambiguously presented himself as the follower of the Russian law’s supremacy 
over any international treaties. He claimed that the provisions of the Russian 
Constitution, which envisaged the supremacy of international law over the national 
one,5 did not imply any automatic “delegation of sovereignty”, and that this 
“supremacy” did not refer to the Constitution itself.6 He nonetheless stressed that 
the Convention formed part of the Russian legal system. Zorkin was also critical 
of the European school of law, as rooted in Roman law, which he considered too 
detailed and casuistic. According to Zorkin, the interpretation of the law should be 
“consistent with both its letter and its spirit”, which should allow the recognition 
of adequate contexts.7
In another article, Zorkin made a straightforward statement that 
“participation of the Russian Federation in the international treaty does not mean 
4  “Russia vs. the European Court of Human Rights”, published: 24.11.2010, https://www.
osw.waw.pl/print/18901 [access: 20.05.2017].
5  Article 15 § 4 of the Russian Constitution states: “The universally-recognised norms of 
international law and international treaties and agreements of the Russian Federation shall be a 
component part of its legal system. If an international treaty or agreement of the Russian Federation 
establishes other rules than those envisaged by law, the rules of the international agreement shall be 
applied”.
6 http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2015/05/28/594165-valerii-zorkin-priznal-
prioritet-konstitutsii, published: 28.05.2015, [access: 24.01.2017].
7  W. Zorkin, Law and only law, “Rossijskaja Gazeta”, published: 23.03.2015, https://
rg.ru/2015/03/23/zorkin-site.html [access: 24.01.2017].
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abandoning its sovereignty, the legal expression of which is the supremacy of 
the Constitution”.8
Elaborating on this standpoint, Zorkin referred to the fear that, following 
the will of most CE Member States, the States initially unwilling to comply 
might eventually recognise the rights of transgender people, or the right to avoid 
mandatory military service. He further objected to the “activistic” practice of the 
ECHR, which allegedly forced its decisions on CE member states.9 His objection 
regarding politicisation was also reflected in the following statement. “Very often, 
human rights and their protection, especially in recent times, become tools for 
manipulating and resolving political issues and problems. Therefore, we must do 
everything to eliminate the dangerous trend of the politicisation of the application 
of the Convention [on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms] and a slide 
towards a cold war”.10 
In addition, in the same article, the Chairman of the Russian CC criticised 
“the law-making function of the ECHR”, using the following words: “I have 
already said more than once that the law-making function of the ECHR as a 
supranational judicial body, which is not inscribed in the system of checks and 
balances inherent in democratic States, within the framework of the separation 
of powers, suffers from a lack of democratic legitimacy”.11 Zorkin thus objected 
to one of the key rulings passed by the ECHR in the case of Tyrer vs. the United 
Kingdom,12 reflecting the fact that the evolutive doctrine was based on the well-
established notion that the Convention is a living instrument which must be 
interpreted according to present-day conditions.13 This leads to the conclusion 
that Russian problems with enforcing ECHR rulings mainly stem from the lack 
of political will. The Kremlin’s gradual entry to an authoritarian path, along with 
the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of the armed conflict in the Donbas, 
had taken the Russian Federation to the point at which it felt compelled to secure 
its political and economic interests, fearing defeat in the crucial and prestigious 
cases pending before the ECHR. These fears appear justified in the light of the 
ECHR annual report, revealing that 7 821 complaints had been lodged against the 
Russian Federation in 2016, placing it in fourth position among the sued States, 
with an approximately 10% share of the total number of complaints filed with the 
8  W. Zorkin, Russia and Strasbourg, “Rossijskaja Gazeta”, published: 21.10.2015,  http://
rg.ru/2015/10/21/zorkin.html [access: 24.01.2017].
9  Ibidem.
10  Ibidem.
11  Ibidem.
12  Case No. 5856/72 “Tyrer vs. the United Kingdom”.
13  B. Liżewski, Application of law in legal order of the Council of Europe, “Studia Iuridica 
Lublinensia” 2015, t. XXIV, nr 2.
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ECHR in 2016.14 The challenge of avoiding the enforcement of “inconvenient” 
ECHR rulings was entrusted to the Russian CC and to Zorkin, a former member of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and a keen follower of the socage ideas, 
invariably enjoying much trust from the Kremlin. 
The Russian Constitutional Court draws its mandate from the Constitution of 
the Russian Federation adopted on 12 December 1993 through a referendum, and 
taking effect on 25 December 1993. The whole of Chapter 7 of the Constitution 
deals with judicial power. The issues of the Constitutional Court are dealt 
with in Art. 125 and 128. The extensive provisions of Art. 125 determine the 
CC composition15 and competences, which include considering cases on the 
correspondence of the indicated laws with the Constitution, resolving disputes 
on jurisdiction matters, indicating the binding interpretation of the Constitution 
provisions, and providing, at the request of  the Council of the Federation, a 
conclusion on the observance of the fixed procedure for advancing charges of 
treason or of other grave crimes against the President of the Russian Federation.16 
14  The ECHR annual report for 2016, as of 31 December 2016, p. 192. The document is 
available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Annual_report_2016_ENG.pdf. The total number 
of complaints received in 2016 amounted to 79 750. The most complaints were filed against Ukraine 
(18 171), Turkey (12 575) and Hungary (8 962).
15  The number of CC judges was determined to be 19.
16  Art. 125 § 2 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation: “The Constitutional Court 
of the Russian Federation upon requests of the President of the Russian Federation, the Council 
of the Federation, the State Duma, one fifth of the members of the Council of the Federation 
or of the deputies of the State Duma, the Government of the Russian Federation, the Supreme 
Court of the Russian Federation and the Higher Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation, the 
bodies of legislative and executive power of the subjects of the Russian Federation shall consider 
cases on the correspondence to the Constitution of the Russian Federation of: a) federal laws, 
normative acts of the President of the Russian Federation, the Council of the Federation, the State 
Duma, the Government of the Russian Federation; b) the constitutions of republics, charters, and 
also the laws and other normative acts of subjects of the Russian Federation adopted on issues 
under the jurisdiction of the bodies of state authority of the Russian Federation or under the joint 
jurisdiction of the bodies of state authority of the Russian Federation and the bodies of state 
authority of the subjects of the Russian Federation; c) treaties concluded between the bodies of 
state authority of the Russian Federation and the bodies of state authority of the subjects of the 
Russian Federation, treaties concluded between the bodies of state authority of the subjects of 
the Russian Federation; d) international treaties and agreements of the Russian Federation which 
have not come into force. § 3. The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation shall resolve 
disputes on jurisdiction: a) between the federal bodies of state authority; b) between the bodies 
of state authority of the Russian Federation and the bodies of state authority of the subjects of 
the Russian Federation; c) between the higher bodies of state authority of the subjects of the 
Russian Federation. § 4. The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, upon complaints 
about violations of constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens and upon court requests shall 
check, according to the rules fixed by federal law, the constitutionality of a law applied or subject 
to be applied in a concrete case. § 5. The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, upon the 
requests of the President of the Russian Federation, the Council of the Federation, the State Duma, 
Maciej Moryc120
Art. 128 determines, inter alia, the mode of appointing Constitutional Court 
judges, while making reference to Federal Constitutional Law as providing more 
detailed regulations on the competences, mode of establishment and activities of 
the Constitutional Court. 
It should also be noted that the Constitution of the Russian Federation vests 
in Russian citizens the right to have their cases examined by a court, including the 
right to resort to international tribunals responsible for the protection of human 
rights and freedoms. This directly arises from Art. 46 § 3 of the Constitution, under 
which “Everyone shall have the right to appeal, according to international treaties 
of the Russian Federation, to international bodies for the protection of human 
rights and freedoms, if all the existing internal state means of legal protection 
have been exhausted”. It, therefore, flows from the Constitution that referring a 
complaint to an international body is conditional on the prior exhausting of the 
internal means of legal protection and valid court decisions. This provision seems 
to have been enacted to facilitate the lodging of complaints with the ECHR, and 
it satisfies the formal requirements stipulated in the Convention. The conclusion 
can even be drawn that, by including such a provision in its Constitution, Russia 
has acknowledged that the system of the protection of human rights, as grounded 
in the Convention and the ECHR, constitutes the centre of the European human 
rights protection system which the Russian Federation joined on ratifying the 
Convention.
The Constitutional provisions on the CC were further developed in the 
Federal Constitutional Law of 21 July 1994 on the Constitutional Court  of the 
Russian Federation (voting in the State Duma took place on 24 June 1994, and in 
the Council of the Federation, i.e. the upper house of the Russian Parliament, on 
12 July 1994). The Law failed to envisage any role of the CC in the processing of 
cases against the Russian Federation referred to international courts and tribunals. 
However, as the conflict between Russia and the Council of Europe intensified, the 
CC was vested with the power to adjudicate on Russia’s enforcement, or failure to 
enforce rulings passed by international bodies.
Following the amendments of 14 December 2015 to the Law on the 
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the CC was granted the power 
to make conclusions on whether the verdicts issued by international bodies, 
the Government of the Russian Federation, the bodies of the legislative power of the subjects of 
the Russian Federation, shall give its interpretation of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. 
§ 6. Acts or their provisions recognised as unconstitutional shall become invalid; international 
treaties and agreements not corresponding to the Constitution of the Russian Federation shall not 
be liable to enforcement and application. § 7. The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, 
upon the request of the Council of the Federation, shall provide a conclusion on the observance 
of the fixed procedure for advancing charges of treason or of another grave crime against the 
President of the Russian Federation”.
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responsible for adjudicating on matters of the protection of human rights and 
freedoms, complied with the Constitution of the Russian Federation17. Paragraph 
3.2 was added to Art. 3, reading as follows: 
Shall, upon requests by federal executive body competent to operate in the field of 
protecting Russia’s sovereign interests within the procedure of considering complaints 
filed against the Russian Federation, which is carried out by the interstate human rights 
protection institution according to an international covenant to which Russia is a party, 
resolve the issue of feasibility of the enforcement of the interstate human rights protection 
institution’s decision. 
The Russian executive authorities (including in particular the Ministry 
of Justice) were thus officially allowed to refer to the Constitutional Court any 
decisions passed by international courts and tribunals which, in their opinion, 
impinged on the political or economic interests of the Russian Federation. 
Under the newly-adopted provisions, on 19 April 2016, the CC, at the request 
of the Minister of Justice, found that the ECHR judgement dated 4 July 2013, 
in the case of Anchugov and Gladkov vs. Russia (complaints Nos. 11157/04 
and 15162/05), forcing Russia to amend its regulations which deprived citizens 
serving jail sentences of the right to vote,18 contradicted the Constitution of the 
Russian Federation. The ECHR judgement was seen as violating Art. 32 § 3 of the 
Constitution, stipulating that “Citizens recognised by court as legally unfit, as well 
as citizens kept in places of confinement under a court sentence, shall be deprived 
of the right to elect and be elected”, in the part referring to citizens kept in prisons 
under valid judicial decisions. It is worth stressing that the arguments put forward 
by the Russian Federation before the ECHR were also grounded in the notion of 
the supremacy of the principal Act over international laws. The ECHR did not 
recognise those arguments as valid. 
17  Federal Constitutional Law of 14 December 2015 N 7-ФКЗ on introducing amendments to 
the Federal Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation.
18  An identical issue had previously arisen, inter alia, in the complaints filed against the United 
Kingdom (Judgement of the Grand Chamber of the ECHR of 6 October 2005 in the case of Hirst 
vs. the United Kingdom [No. 2], complaint No. 74025/01, ECHR 2005-IX; ECHR Judgement of 23 
November 2010 in the case of Greens and M.T. vs. the United Kingdom, complaints Nos. 60041/08 
and 60054/08) and Italy (Judgement of the Grand Chamber of the ECHR of 22 May 2012 in the case 
of Scoppola vs. Italy [No. 3], complaint No. 126/05). The objections raised by prisoners concerned 
their right to free vote, protected under Art. 3 of Protocol No. 1. In the ground-breaking judgement 
passed in the case of Hirst vs. the United Kingdom [No. 2], the Strasbourg Court ruled that the ban 
on all prisoners’ exercising the right to vote, merely because of serving their sentence, was contrary 
to the Convention’s standards. This position was upheld in the subsequent rulings: http://www.hfhr.
pl/europejska-konwencja-praw-czlowieka-a-rosyjska-konstytucja-komentarz-do-wyroku-etpcz-w-
sprawie-anchugov-i-gladkov-przeciwko-rosji/ [access: 21.05.2017].
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The CC judgement gave rise to strong criticism, being considered a dangerous 
precedent.19 Along with the common “politicisation”-related accusations, the 
judgement was viewed as directly violating the undertakings made by the Russian 
Federation following its accession to the CE. The wording of Art. 46 of the 
Convention unambiguously obliges the Signatory States to implement ECHR 
rulings. It was further stressed that, on signing the Convention, Russia had made 
no objections as to the limited or conditional enforcement of ECHR judgements.20
Russia can also be accused of violating the Vienna Convention on the 
law of treaties, the provisions of which (and, more specifically, of its Art. 27) 
unambiguously stipulate “[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal 
law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty”. In addition, the ECHR, when 
justifying its judgements, strongly affirmed that the provisions of the Convention 
were supreme to national regulations, regardless of the internal hierarchy of legal 
Acts, as nationally applied, and it has consistently upheld its jurisprudence.21
19  This was not the first ECHR judgement which the Russian Federation refused to enforce. It 
had also refused to comply with the judgement passed in the case of Catan vs. Russia and Moldova 
(complaints Nos. 43370/04, 18454/06 and 8252/05) of 19 October 2012, in which the ECHR 
considered the right to pursue education in the Romanian language by a resident of the separatist 
Transdniestria. In the course of judgement enforcement control by the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe, the Russian Federation stated that it would not accept the judgement or pay 
the damages adjudicated in favour of the claimant – I.C. Kamiński, Suspending the Rights of the 
Russian Delegation in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, published: 02.02.2015, 
http://www.hfhr.pl/zawieszenie-praw-rosyjskiej-delegacji-w-zgromadzeniu-parlamentarnym-rady-
europy/ [access: 23.05.2017].
20  Sz. Kardaś, Russia refuses to implement the judgement of the European Court of Human 
Rights, published: 20.04.2016, http://www.osw.waw.pl/print/24302 [access: 10.08.2016].
21  The Case of Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia, Nos. 11157/04 and 15162/05: 50. The Court 
reiterates that Article 1 requires the States Parties to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the 
rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention”. That provision makes no distinction 
as to the type of rule or measure concerned, and does not exclude any part of the Member States’ 
“jurisdiction” from scrutiny under the Convention (see Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret 
Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland [GC], No. 45036/98, § 153, ECHR 2005 VI; Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. 
the United Kingdom, No. 61498/08, § 128, ECHR 2010 (extracts); and Nada v. Switzerland [GC], 
No. 10593/08, § 168, ECHR 2012). It is, therefore, with respect to their “jurisdiction” as a whole – 
which is often exercised in the first place through the Constitution – that the States Parties are called 
on to show compliance with the Convention (see United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. 
Turkey, 30 January 1998, § 29, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 I); 108. The Court further 
notes the Government’s argument that the present case is distinguishable from Hirst (No. 2), as in 
Russia a provision imposing a voting bar on convicted prisoners is laid down in the Constitution 
– the basic law of Russia adopted following a nationwide vote – rather than in an “ordinary” legal 
instrument enacted by a parliament, as was the case in the United Kingdom (…). In that connection 
the Court reiterates that, according to its established case-law, a Contracting Party is responsible 
under Article 1 of the Convention for all acts and omissions of its organs regardless of whether the 
act or omission in question was a consequence of domestic law or of the necessity to comply with 
international legal obligations (…). As noted in paragraph 50 above, Art. 1 makes no distinction 
The Role of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation in the Enforcement... 123
As already mentioned, the CC ruling was precedential, and made room for the 
executive authorities of the Russian Federation to refer to the CC for review the 
ECHR decisions which they did not intend to comply with. Rather than all ECHR 
judgements’ being referred to the CC, this procedure was meant to be limited 
to those decisions which could potentially bring political or economic harm to 
Moscow. As had been expected, the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation 
queried the CC about the implementation, or failure to implement, the ECHR 
judgement in the case of the Yukos shareholders vs. Russia,22 obliging Russia to 
pay a record-breaking sum of EUR 1 866 104 634 to the crude-oil giant as “just 
compensation” (damages for sustained losses), and another EUR 300 000 to cover 
the legal costs incurred by the claimants.23 The Yukos case may be viewed as 
having provided the major incentive for the Russian Government to introduce the 
reference legislative amendments to the Law on the CC, in order to facilitate the 
blocking of the implementation of international judgements disfavouring Russia. 
The CC issued a decision on the Yukos case on 19 January 2017. Not 
surprisingly, it ruled that the Russian Federation could not implement the ECHR 
judgement. The essence of the 67-page-long justification very much corresponded 
to the statement made by Zorkin – “Russia is allowed not to fulfil the obligations 
imposed where such non-fulfilment constitutes the only way to prevent the 
violation of the Constitution of the Russian Federation”. Although the justification 
was meant to present legal arguments, experts seem to agree that its content was 
politically orchestrated by the Kremlin.
Following the amendments to the Law on the CC in December 2015, the CC 
received prerogatives unprecedented on the European scale, enabling it to issue 
binding statements on whether the Russian Federation could or could not execute 
judgements by international bodies. The CC in the Russian Federation was thus 
placed in a privileged position in relation to any international judicial bodies, and 
Moscow received a useful tool to make the arbitrary selection of rulings issued by 
the ECHR (and other international tribunals) which it intended to comply with. 
This has, on the one hand, set a dangerous precedent, and, on the other, constituted 
a gross violation, on the part of Russia, of the standards of international law, 
as to the type of rule or measure concerned, and does not exclude any part of a member State’s 
“jurisdiction” – which is often exercised in the first place through the Constitution – from scrutiny 
under the Convention. The Court notes that this interpretation is in line with the principle set out in 
Art. 27 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (…).
22  Complaint No. 14902/04.
23  At this point, it is worth referring to another case adjudicated by the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration (PCA) in the Hague, in which Yukos shareholders sued the Russian Federation. The case 
(No. 2005-03/AA226) ended in the PCA’s issuing a decision obliging Russia to pay the astronomical 
amount of USD 50 020 867 798 for the benefit of the claimants. The typescript containing the 
PCA justification of its decision was as many as 615 pages long. The implementation of the PCA 
judgement by the Russian Federation would mean bringing down the federal budget.
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especially in the light of the above-cited Art. 27 of the Vienna Convention on the 
law of treaties, excluding the possibility to invoke the provisions of national law 
in order to justify failure to fulfil treaty obligations. Moreover, the CC issued its 
decision under the full subordination, if not political servility, to the executive 
power. Although Russian courts formally enjoy independence, in reality they 
form the weakest element in the separation-of-powers model, and they hardly 
ever overtly act against the expectations of the other centres of political powers. 
This can be viewed as a follow-up to the Soviet traditions and political model.
On these grounds, the Russian Government may be rightly expected to 
continue referring “inconvenient” ECHR judgements to its CC with an attempt 
to procure decisions formally blocking their enforcement. A more far-reaching 
conclusion can also be made that the same will apply to the ECHR judgement 
to be passed in the Beslan case,24 obliging Russia to pay damages to victims' 
families, reaching nearly EUR 3 000 000.
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SUMMARY
The article describes accumulation of the conflict between the Russian Federation and the 
European Court of Human Rights. This process resulted in final implementation by the Russian 
Federation legal institutions, which legally allow not to implement ECHR’s judgements, alleging 
them in contradiction of the Russian Constitution. The main role in this process started to perform 
Russian Constitutional Court (CC). CC, requested by the executive body, may decide that ECHR’s 
judgment contradicts the Russian Constitution, which would result in lack of possibilities to execute 
such judgment. This kind of legal regulation is unprecedented among the legal systems of the 
Council of Europe member states, and poses a serious violation of international treaties, signed by 
the Russian Federation.
Keywords: European Court of Human Rights; Council of Europe; Russian Federation; 
constitutional court; Russian Constitutional Court; human rights in Russia
STRESZCZENIE
W artykule zostało opisane narastanie konfliktów między Federacją Rosyjską a Europejskim 
Trybunałem Praw Człowieka. Proces ten skutkował ostatecznie wdrożeniem przez Rosję 
instrumentów prawnych, pozwalających na niewykonywanie wybranych orzeczeń ETPC pod 
zarzutem ich niezgodności z rosyjską konstytucją. Główna rola w tym względzie przypadła 
rosyjskiemu Sądowi Konstytucyjnemu (SK). SK, na wniosek organu władzy wykonawczej, na 
gruncie obowiązujących przepisów może orzec o niezgodności orzeczenia ETPC z konstytucją FR, 
co w praktyce uniemożliwia skuteczną egzekucję takiego orzeczenia. Przyjęcie takiego rozwiązania 
jest niespotykane na gruncie prawodawstwa innych państw członkowskich Rady Europy oraz 
stanowi istotne pogwałcenie umów międzynarodowych, których Rosja jest stroną.
Słowa kluczowe: Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka; Rada Europy; Federacja Rosyjska; 
Rosja, sąd konstytucyjny; Trybunał Konstytucyjny Federacji Rosyjskiej; prawa człowieka w Rosji

